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The paper include mostly the results o f works o f the Research Institute fo r Mechanics o f Quick­
proceeding Processes united in a general research direction -  creation o f the methodology for risk 
assessment and risk management for ecologically hazardous systems, consisting o f the set o f different 
technological analyzed objects. The elements o f system can be characterized by high level o f 
radiation, toxic, explosion, fire and other hazards. The probalistic and deterministic approach for risk 
assessment, based on mathematical methods o f system analysis, non-liner dynamics and computer 
simulation, has been developed. Branching in problem definition, as well as diversity o f factor and 
criteria for determination o f system status, is also taken into account. The risks caused by both 
objective and subjective factors (including human factor) are examined. In many performed studies, 
the leading structural element, dominating in determination o f the system safety, is the structural part 
o f an object. The methodology is implemented for the safety analysis (risk assessment) fo r Chernobyl 
NPP Shelton Object and other industrial buildings.
УДК 621.039.58-351.354
Introduction
According to the concept of sustainable development 
of the civilization [1], the leading role in the solution of 
actual problems of management strategy for human 
activities belongs to new scientific interdisciplinary 
approach -  applied risks theory.
Fig. 1
The typical examples of EO are: the Shelton 
Object (SO) -  a special structure for localization of 
Chernobyl NPP Unit 4, suffered as a result of 
nuclear accident in 1986 (fig. 1) [2]; Odessa’s 
terminal of Chemicals (fig. 2) and number of other 
industrial buildings of such type [3].
Fig. 2
The methodology for risk assessment and 
management for ecologically hazardous systems 
(EHS) is examined. The elements of EHS are 
characterized by high level of potential hazard 
(radiation, toxic, explosive, fire, etc.) for the humans 
and the environment.
The extreme objects (EO) are one of the latest 
studied EHS classes. They consist of buildings, 
structures, machines, instruments, equipment and 
protection means, not intended for work under the 
conditions of extremely high risks and occasionally 
found themselves in the area of increased risk as a 
result of the accident.
The general EO theory is based on studying the 
peculiarities, specific for the whole class of such 
objects, i.e. regardless of their functionality. So, 
damaged atomic submarine or space vehicle can be 
easily repaired to the normal state under the 
deployment conditions. But the damages, occurring 
far from the base, could transform the repair into a 
hardly solvable problem that has elements of 
statement, common for the both objects. The 
common is that the initially closed system, as a 
result of an accident, becomes the subsystem of 
more complicate many-dimensional system. As a 
result of an accident, something like dissolution of
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the initial system in the macrosystem, including not 
only technical, but also most complicate normative, 
legal, human, economical problems, etc.
These characteristic aspects are relevant also to 
SO. This object, if the nuclear and radiation hazard 
factors are excluded, could turn into an ordinary 
reconstruction object [2]. But its status of an object 
of nuclear power engineering complicates risks 
analysis and management so much that during last 
17 years no significant achievements, adequate to 
spent resources and efforts, have been reached.
There are five main peculiarities of EO:
-  condition of object does not comply with the 
existing standards by any parameter;
-  uniqueness of its functionality;
-  dominating significance of solution of the main 
problem (EO dominant), which all other goals are 
subjected to;
-  exceptional complexity and individuality of the 
problem that has complex interdisciplinary features;
-  determinative role of research to exclude errors 
with significant negative consequences.
Almost all investigation methods have deep prove to 
be inconsistent in analysis of such systems [2; 3].
The deterministic methods, as basic theoretical 
apparatus to ensure “absolutely” reliable forecast of 
changes in object properties and to develop efficient 
countermeasures, became substantially insufficient 
to overcome increasing difficulties and uncertainties, 
characteristic for EO.
From the certain threshold of difficulties, the 
probabilistic analysis has become the basic regulated 
mean to assess risks (aviation, cosmonautics, nuclear 
power engineering, etc. [4; 5]). But decrease of 
actual probabilities as the main way in risk 
management becomes unacceptable for the objects, 
containing unique elements of system [6]. To 
analyze such systems, it is impossible to apply 
classical reliability methods because of absence of 
required statistically representative data.
Branch methods, developed even for quite 
complicate systems, taking into account mutual 
influence of different elements and links, cannot be 
extended to EO whose main features principally 
differ from those of typical objects. So, using 
traditional approaches of the reliability theory, 
consisting in formation of the event and failure tree 
in NPP operation analysis, it is possible to obtain for 
SO comparatively short and tamely ramified trees, 
determining the influence of initial events on system 
behavior. But correct probability assessment is quite 
difficult by two main reasons:
-  complexity of the mathematical apparatus (non­
linearity of the dynamic processes, presence of 
distributions with “heavy tails” [3], that are
characterized by significant, but quite rare events -  
they are “cut” in traditional statistical analysis);
-  high uncertainty of the initial information.
This complexity of the mathematical problem is a
reflection of discrepancy of the method, necessary 
for EO analysis, with the regulating requirements for 
the analysis of single-type objects of the branch, 
worked out basing on data collection and statistical 
generalization on the representative set of standard 
elements. Two other important factors are also 
manifested:
-  principal difference between technological 
processes for EO and typical industrial objects;
-  practical unreasonableness of implementation 
of engineering solutions, being made without 
appropriate clarity' of the results, that ensures only 
insubstantial level of safety.
At SO and other EO, the disadvantages of set- 
theoretic expert approaches have been manifested in 
significant extent. These approaches require 
involving of many high-skilled and well-informed 
specialists whose opinions are analyzed and 
synthesized using different methods for processing 
of expert appraisal. Under the conditions of 
incompleteness of valid initial information, for 
actual level of individual and common knowledge 
about SO, the “variety” of result summarizing 
methods can just veil but not improve the current 
situation when “averaged” conclusion becomes 
invalid.
That is why the determination of methodology 
without the above disadvantages is extremely 
important.
Basic principles
of the investigation method proposed
Selection and substantiation of the efficient risk 
management system for EO functioning is possible with 
usage of system approach only. The probabilistic and 
deterministic apparatus for risk investigation in based on 
mathematical methods of system analysis, non-linear 
dynamics and computer simulation.
The necessity' in system approach is caused by 
the formulation of many ramified statements of 
common problem, diverse factors and criteria of 
system status, selections of efficient management 
strategies. The risks are examined on both objective 
and subjective basis (in particular, taking into 
account the human factor).
Application of system analysis methods for EO 
risk management has shown that, to achieve valid 
results, not only strict observance of actual 
maintenance (operation) norms and object status 
assessment rules is required, but also scientific 
substantiation of reasonable deviations from rules 
and norms in force.
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Basing on study of the set of EO, it is possible to 
mark out the following basic statements of the 
method of combined numerical, simulation and 
experimental investigations, related to organization 
of risk management activities:
-  the problem of system multiple-factor safety 
analysis is examined; the safety is determined by the 
risks of damage of protection barriers as a result of 
degradation or catastrophic changes in EO structure;
-  the behavior is described by solution of bound 
non-linear dynamic tasks that represent the process 
of change of the system and its effect on the 
environment up to complete exhaustion of operating 
abilities; in this case EO is represented as space-time 
structure from the elements of different nature;
-  the main instrument of the analysis is the 
apparatus of probabilistic and deterministic 
simulation, where only valid information 
(documentary materials on reference areas) is used 
for verification of the results, and the expert 
appraisals are used as minimal, as necessary;
-  the research apparatus is created, taking into 
account certain EO peculiarities.
Full lists of initial events are envisaged by branch 
norms, but performing EO analysis, in view of short­
term calculated extreme period, the substantiated 
attempts to reduce this list by excluding the events, 
the probability of occurrence of those is negligible 
(e.g., strong earthquake), are being carried out.
However, because of stochastic character of such 
events, mechanical exclusion of the rarest events 
with possible catastrophic consequences, that is 
sometimes proposed to do volitionally, could 
become unjustified.
It should be noted that composition of this list for 
EO (as well as working out the most important 
safety criteria, that is an important part of risk theory 
methodology) undergoes the significant influence of 
the forcible “human factor”, though it is performed 
on the scientific basis.
On the certain stages of research organization on 
SO, the method of expert appraisals prevailed even 
when making quite important decisions; and this fact 
leaded to non-justified increase of “human factor”. 
The reason of these failures was in impossibility to 
form the commission of statistically representative 
set of specialists, having necessary knowledge about 
SO. Because of complexity and inconvenience of 
this infonnation, the agreement procedure often 
leaded to division of specialists into two groups -  
majority, where the opinion of leaders was of main 
importance, and minority, defending their individual 
opinions.
The probabilistic part of the methodology 
includes description and analysis of the random
functions, definition of stochastic models of the 
dynamic processes (loads, physical, mechanical and 
other initial parameters, technological situations and 
their effect on the system-forming parameters and 
other components with significantly uncertain 
conditions). The results of intermediate stages of 
probabilistic analysis consist of assessment and 
formation of the most changeable initial data for the 
deterministic calculations. Successive examination 
of the whole event tree during simulation of the 
negative scenario allows obtaining o f basic 
probabilistic quantitative risk evaluation for possible 
releases, contamination, increase of exposure rates, 
damages and other process characteristics.
The deterministic part of the analysis consists in 
successive computer simulation of system evolution, 
degradation and destructurization stages. 
Possibilities for buckling failure are determined on 
each characteristic section of system development 
trajectory. This effect occurs under manifestations of 
sensitivity to slight actions near the bifurcation 
points, when in antecedent state the vicinity of 
manifestation of soft branching or rigid catastrophic 
jump of extreme or degradation changes.
Problem statement and SO safety
investigation methods
As a basic example for EO risks assessment, SO 
is considered.
SO risk is a multiple-factor value and signifies 
the threat of additional radiation damage for the 
staff, environment and population, in the case when 
the share of radioactive materials, localized now 
inside SO and at adjacent industrial site, will lose 
existing engineering and natural safety barriers. The 
concept of risk includes the character of the events, 
their probability, nature and weight of hazardous 
consequences.
The statement of investigations considered such 
specific SO features [7], which are characteristic for 
mitigation of the consequences of earthquakes and 
similar damages:
-  the design documentation for the whole object, 
as well as detailed documentation for the majority of 
SO premises where the activities are supposed to be 
performed, is absent.
-  chaos as the most specific feature of the 
premises where the major part of the Fuel 
Containing Materials (FCM) and Radioactive Waste 
(RW) is located. It makes working out new design 
documentation more difficult.
-  the dangerous status of many SO premises 
make more difficult (or even impossible) performan­
ce of active process operations without carrying out 
preliminary analysis and prevention of possible 
consequences of applied mechanical actions.
Вісник НАУ. 2003. №2
There are characteristics for SO and mining 
activities (underground and open-cast), including 
uranium mining:
-  spatial (dimensional) restrictions inside SO are 
to be taken into account when examining access to 
FCM accumulations, as well as performing process 
operations;
-  climatic conditions inside SO (temperature, 
humidity, velocity and direction of air streams) 
practically cannot be regulated and are determined 
by weather conditions outside SO;
-  non-fixed radioactive dust is the determinative 
factor for radiation safety of the staff. Generation of 
radioactive dust during performance of process 
operation can lead to spreading of radioactive 
contamination through other SO and ChNPP 
premises, as well as to contamination of technical 
means, equipment and environment.
-  content of fissile nuclear materials (235U, 
2 3 9 ’ 241Pu, 24!’243Am) in FCM is small in comparison 
with the mass of FCM and other RW and is 
characterized by significant non-uniformity by SO 
premises.
-  FCM are located not only in internal SO 
premises, but also at the industrial site, where they 
can interact with atmospheric precipitates and 
groundwater.
There are characteristics for SO and for atomic 
industry and mitigation of the consequences of 
accidents on nuclear objects:
-  potential hazard for initiation of chain reaction 
when dealing with FCM requires observance of 
acting rules and norms of nuclear safety, worked out 
for management with fissile nuclear materials.
-  high radiation fields limit (or exclude) 
participation of staff in carrying out the activities, 
repair and maintenance of the equipment.
Essential part of SO consists of the elements of 
destroyed Unit 4, so system safety is determined by 
the reliability of its structures. Failure of these 
structures can lead to changes in configuration of 
nuclear hazardous materials, as well as to release of 
radionuclides to the environment and other negative 
consequences. SO does not comply with the 
requirements of normative documents of the nuclear 
power engineering. The methods of direct 
investigations and measurements in essential part of 
SO are ineffective because of high level of radiation 
and blocking of the access routes.
The dominant of SO, according to its status, is 
the primary task to transform the damaged unit into 
the controllable state. To reach this goal, such items 
are investigated:
-  potentially unreliable and vulnerable complica­
te system, consisting of qualitatively different elements;
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-  dynamic transient bifurcation processes with 
fuzzy buckling failure criteria on the path sections;
-  various initial events and failures;
-  essentially incomplete and incorrect compo­
nents of databases;
-  technical and technological monitoring means;
-  system to work out controlling decisions and to 
react under emergency situations.
The main obstacle in solution of dominating SO 
task is uncertainty in data on risk factors. The key 
risk factors are the parameters o f sources o f nuclear, 
radiation and other hazards, as well as characteristics 
of structure damages. To obtain necessary 
information, during recent years, a great scope of 
work has been performed at SO. Overcoming 
exceptional difficulties, various data on SO system 
components were accumulated. A part of these 
characteristics can be used to build fragments of 
adequate SO models and to verify the results of 
indirect studies. Flow'ever, in whole, initial SO 
information is insufficient. This is proved by the 
attempts to analyze SO status made by the leading 
organizations, that, in fact, had no success [2].
As an example, the results of evaluation of 
process idea of grouting in concrete the main part of 
SO internal space to conserve it for many years. The 
investigations were performed by three groups of 
high-skilled experts that applied similar certified 
methods and powerful software. The difference in 
approaches was determined only by boundary 
conditions in task statements, where the location of 
nuclear hazardous materials was fixed.
There were obtained three mathematical results, 
substantiating fundamentally different proposals. In the 
first option, there was proved that long-term safety of 
monolithic structure would be guaranteed even if 
ordinary concrete were used. In the second, there was 
determined that to eliminate negative local heat and 
nuclear effects when grouting areas with hazardous 
sources, special processes and materials should be used. 
The third conclusion had shown full inconsistency of 
this idea, because its implementation must lead to 
inadmissible consequences.
The similar situation arises when evaluating SO 
structure reliability. In this case, different high- 
skilled experts are making mutually exclusive 
conclusions regarding the same units of SO 
structures, although there is the functional basis of 
structure mechanics and theory. These analysis 
means allow not only valid calculation of stages of 
elastic and non-linear deformation of elements using 
normative criteria of marginal states, but also 
simulation of their behavior up to full-destruction. 
For quite accurate representation of damage 
parameters and pre-history of design-basis operation
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of elements, it is possible to determine the residual 
bearing capacity and other characteristics of the 
“critical areas”, as well as the whole SO structure.
But the validity of the initial information is 
ensured only for a part of damaged SO structures 
(for slightly damaged fragments, normative methods 
are used, fully destroyed areas are excluded). 
Intermediate damage characteristics for other 
structures of Unit 4, belonging to SO, are into this 
wide range. So, dependent on the choice of 
presuppositions for formation of initial information, 
significantly different results can be obtained.
Two main streams for SO status assessment have 
been formed.
In the first stream, the statements of nuclear 
power engineering norms are strictly used. If the 
problem specification is insufficient, it is 
supplemented with the worst possible conditions 
basing on the conservatism principle. In this 
approach, the defect SO structure is calculated for 
action of excessive loads, because the necessity to 
take into account the extreme situations is strictly 
regulated, although these situations have quite low 
probability to appear. Such events include intensive 
earthquakes, hurricanes and tornadoes with 
significant velocities of air streams and pressure 
pulses, aircraft crashes, explosions inside and 
outside SO, fires, and exclusively unfavorable 
combination of different factors. The situation is 
complicated by conservatism in assessments of 
development in weakening of structures as a result 
of corrosion, erosion, creep and embitterment of 
structures, decrease in crack resistance, settlements 
and watering of foundation, other physical and 
chemical degradations. As a result, the conclusion is 
made that SO structure does not comply with the 
actual criteria. This is a foundation for conclusions 
on possibility of emergency destruction of nuclear 
and radiation safety barriers, as well as on high level 
of negative consequences of the most dangerous (but 
improbable) initial events.
The current SO operation and transformation 
strategy is based on the second approach, using 
“softening” of the normative requirements of nuclear 
power engineering. This choice is substantiated not 
only by the fact that SO does not correspond to any 
standard class and the existing status of mitigation of 
the consequences at ChNPP accident, but also by 
more important arguments. So, the development of 
the designs for SO structure stabilization has shown 
that the conservatism principle leads to very 
expensive decisions. But the illogicality of such 
investments is explained by two main 
considerations.
Firstly, SO as temporary structure should not be 
more reliable than other ChNPP objects and 
permanent structures, erected without taking into 
account such strong impacts.
Secondly, branch methods, where simplified 
analytical models and quite high coefficients for 
reliability margin are used, do not allow taking into 
account SO peculiarities and, therefore, do not 
ensure its safety after reconstruction and during 
carrying out the activities.
SO: natural, maximal and main
component of risk
It is evident that radioactive materials inside SO 
and at the industrial site are the open sources of 
ionizing radiation. So, SO radiological risk in any 
moment of time is proportional to the total activity, 
localized in SO and at the industrial site. Hence, if 
keeping the localization, risk will decrease with the 
rate of radioactive decay of fission fragments and 
transuranium elements. Because this process is not 
controllable, let us call the risk, proportional to total 
activity, the natural risk. SO natural risk can be 
decreased only in one way -  if the quantity of 
radioactive materials inside SO will be decreased by 
their transportation to another place, e.g. to RW 
storage.
Thanks to SO maintenance, natural risk is 
managed to be localized inside SO, i.e. natural risk 
is rather a characteristic of an object itself than an 
indicator of damage for population and environment.
Let us examine the hypothetical case when the 
maintenance of SO is stopped by some reasons. 
Neither the staff, nor population does not intervene 
in the natural processes in SO. Non-intervention is 
also a kind of activity in post-accidental period.
The possible scenario for SO evolution is the 
following:
-  the building structures are slowly destroying, 
the presence of moisture (condensed or 
precipitating), along with seasonal fluctuations in 
temperature, hasten this process;
-  slow destruction of FCM and leaching of heavy 
metals occur, fission fragments and transuranium 
elements come into the solution, flow down and are 
accumulating at SO lower levels;
-  at the certain moment of time, the roof will fall 
down, the walls will become partially destroyed, the 
looseness in the foundation will appear and the 
activity, still existing at that moment, will have 
practically unlimited contact with the environment;
-  any external extreme impacts can significantly 
fasten any processes in the non-interference 
scenario.
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So, the consequence of non-intervention is 
destruction of existing SO safety barriers and direct 
contact of radioactive materials with the 
environment. Expected risk (damage) for non­
intervention by this reason is the maximal. Any SO 
activity can be justified if it leads to decrease of 
expected risk (damage) for further non-intervention.
Current SO status is characterized by four main 
risk components.
Risk of collapse -  existing SO structure has 
limited service life -  30 years from November 1986; 
Self-destruction or collapse can transform SO into 
practically open source of ionizing radiation with 
total activity up to 10 MCi, so such event should be 
classified as radiation accident;
Risk of failure -  some SO structure elements are 
in dangerous state and need to be repaired urgently; 
failure of such structures can initiate SO collapse; in 
any case, this event also is a radiation accident;
Risk of criticality -  location of a share of spent 
nuclear fuel (SNF) inside SO is unknown, hence, it 
is impossible to make the forecast for its criticality. 
Independently from the consequences, reaching the 
criticality level is a radiation accident;
Radiological risk -  a share of FCM is located at 
SO industrial site and is a direct source of local 
radioactive contamination of groundwater; the area 
of radioactive contamination increases as a result of 
migration of radio nuclides; when it will reach the 
water-bearing strata or Pripyaf river basin, the 
increase in collective dose for population of Ukraine 
will become inevitable.
Now, working out and implementation of 
countermeasures can be performed in parallel to 
minimize each risk component. In case of 
transformation of risk as probabilistic event into sure 
event, i.e. in case of appearance of criticality, failure, 
collapse or various combinations of these factors, 
the risks will become interrelated, and the 
catastrophic increase in fourth component -  
radiological risk -  will occur. The last assertion is 
based on the assumption that in case of any radiation 
accident in SO, major share of activity will leave 
inside SO industrial site (as results from FCM 
composition and properties).
Therefore, the radiological risk is the determina­
tive factor both for current SO status (R0) and for 
any its evolution including evolution of first three 
risk components. Hence, the determinative risk is the 
total risk R: R = Ro + AR, where AR is the increase 
of radiation risk as a result of additional 
contamination, that occurs during the release of 
radio nuclides outside SO, caused by any radiation 
accident. Additional risk AR can arise also as a 
result of release of dust and/or aerosols during
performance of activities inside SO without taking 
adequate measures to ensure safety, or as a result of 
discharge of SO radioactive water, caused by 
foundation seal failure or failure in waterproofing of 
SO lower levels.
Risk assessment methodology
An efficiency of applying a methodology of 
extreme objects problems solution built upon an 
interdisciplinary base to research of the SO 
encasement is demonstrated [2]. The encasement 
with connected components is considered to be a 
subject to multi-factor analysis of nuclear, radiation, 
environmental and common safety in the course of 
current exploitation and transformations. The key 
point of the research is a prognosis of behavior of 
the SO structure being degradate under extremely 
combined influences. A vast-purposed technique is 
developed for deterministic and probabilistic 
numerical modeling, risk assessment, experimental 
and design works. Individual tool for considering 
peculiarities of the SO is a complex technique of 
determining the system's state (in scarcely available 
areas) based upon the sequential analysis of the 
reactor core accident, the 4th Unit's destruction and 
the SO erection.
A structural scheme of operational state of the 
CNPP 4 block is built with usage of archival 
documents. Various versions of spatial finite 
element models are developed; they allow the 
realization of the 4 block structural scheme with 
various extents of detailing, using application 
software packages. Analyses of peculiar stress- 
deformed states of the 4th block under various 
combinations of loads and influences are performed 
in order to estimate efficiency of the FEM models 
versions developed. Based on the result 
consideration a computational model of the 4th 
block is chosen for further numerical analysis of its 
constructions' mechanical behavior, including that in 
the course of the core accident and in the course of 
localization and mitigation of the accident 
consequences.
Processes, which took place at the beginning 
stage of the 1986-year accident, are analyzed. The 
main attention is given to changing of pressure in 
reactor volume with consideration of entering of 
heat transmitter in active zone through destroyed 
technological channels and simultaneously exiting 
steam through permanent steam-exiting system and 
through creating clearances in protector shell. On 
this base the movement of the reactor's cover is 
studied, and the interaction between going up-reactor's 
cover and unload-load machine is considered.
The pressure of gas in reactor „volume is 
determined and on this base the pressure on walls 
and covers of central hall and housings of separators
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is calculated, which took place after steam going up 
from reactor volume into neighboring housings.
The general procedure for the determination of 
topography of the reactor active core wreckage 
ejected by explosion as a result of the Chernobyl 
NPP accident has been developed. The regions of 
the failure and the reactor active core ejection have 
been constructed by the numerical experiment series. 
The active core wreckage motion in the field of 
gravity has been explored. The ejected fragments 
topography for the case of the active core explosion 
in the standard position and over the reactor section 
plating has been constructed.
The paper [2] exhibits the usage of developed 
mans for numerical modeling of destruction process 
of the constructions of the Chernobyl NPP Unit 4 
Reactor during the core accident; reliable facts 
related to intermediate and final states of the 
constructions are used as a base to verify the results 
obtained.
The paper deals with modeling of the Unit 4 
building constructions behavior under explosion 
influence during the initial phase of the core 
accident. One of possible versions of the accident 
was under consideration. Values of accident 
influences were obtained from aerodynamic 
analysis. Numerical research of the Unit 4 
constructions behavior under explosion was 
performed by finite elements. To analyze the 
system's dynamic response to the given loading, new 
mark numerical integration of the motion equations 
was applied. A technique to determine ferroconcrete 
constructions destruction criteria was developed; 
consideration of the analysis' results was performed.
Analysis of methods of the safety assessment of 
the SO encasement demonstrates that the existing 
standard codes and technical support are insufficient 
to obtain true quantitative characteristics of the 
encasement for the case of initial event's realization. 
Failure of assumptions have resulted in decreasing 
the level of risk assessment conservatism adopted in 
official requirements. It is proposed that system 
analysis approach be used to research and assess 
negative consequences of the SO protection barriers' 
destruction. A solution is obtained from synthesis of 
probabilistic and deterministic methods as well as 
from usage of tool inspections and expert estimates 
to verify source data and results. The direction being 
proposed is implemented for all phases of risk 
assessment. Characteristic examples are presented 
for the analysis of consequences of the initial events 
of an aircraft falling upon the SO and external 
explosions.
Characteristic peculiarities of a procedure applied 
during safety analysis (risk assessment) of the SO 
encasement are discussed, as well as those of the 
encasement itself which take effect on developing
such procedure. Indicators (functions) of risk to be 
used are formulated; the efficiency of their choice is 
discussed. A mathematical aspect of considering the 
parameters uncertainty within the SO when 
modeling accident processes is characterized, as well 
as this uncertainty's influence upon values of risk 
functions. Some quantitative estimation of risk 
indicators is presented along with conclusions about 
their quality.
At SO, when performing probabilistic part of risk 
assessment, it was proposed not to operate with the 
terms of continuous time, but to attach Markov 
properties to an object in the discrete moments of 
time, divisible by a year. In this case, SO evolution 
model comes to Markov chain with finite number of 
states. Estimation of transient probabilities and 
formation of transient operators of Markov chain 
allow reduction of the analysis to matrix 
transformations of chain with finite number of 
states. As a result, there were formally detected:
-  reliability factors with estimation of 
probabilities for safe operation, as well as of arising 
of the catastrophic states during given number of 
years in terms of strict probabilistic definitions [5];
-  average time before the catastrophic state will 
come (was estimated as system longevity), as well as 
dispersion of this time.
As the dispersion is quite high, the forecast 
becomes very sensitive to accuracy of initial data.
To assess efficiency o f measures, taken to 
increase SO safety level, transient operators of the 
Markov chain reflected change of probabilities of 
events, related to determinate interference of 
humans. Adaptive observation algorithms were used. 
These algorithms ensure the interval assessment of 
transient probabilities in comparison with the global 
characteristics of SO evolution, fixed previously.
Analysis of hypothetical accident scenarios was 
performed in the following way:
-  estimation of probabilities of initial events;
-  progression of accident situation (deterministic 
simulation);
-  assessment of the possibility for origination of 
the nuclear hazard;
-  estimation of volumes, quality and topography 
of releases outside SO;
-  estimation of values of risk functions.
Value
Fk = P { E k}S k, k = W ,  (1)
is taken as a criterium Ek , p { E k } is a separate 
source event and its probability, S k -  a total activity
of material, abandoning SO as a result of realization 
of given negative scenario. The Stochastic multiplier 
/?{£).} was valued as a result of calculation of 
Markov’s chain.
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In general different determining problems of this 
section (dynamic and static of building design, 
convection and diffusion in water-colloidal
ambience inwardly SO and others) is described by 
quasilinear system with local interaction:
. „  . . d u k
k kA  uk +  Fk { t , x , u , a )  =  —  ;
d t
x e V ;  t >  0 ; (2)
I k ( u ,x,p) = 0; x e V ; t =  0; (3)
B k ( t , x , u ,  (L n ) u , (3) = 0 ;
k  =  l N ; x e d V ; t >  0 , (4)
where A* -  a linear differential operator 2nd order 
(Laplas, Navie etc.); L  -  is a linear differential 
operator 1st order (“operator of the flow”)’; d / d t  -  
usual, private or substational derivative on time; 
u =  (u y, . . . ,u N )  =  u ( t , x )  -  a collection of dynamic 
variables, which describes the condition of the 
system, and is a function of the spatial coordinates
x - ( x , y , z ) e V  a  i?3 and time t; d V  -  a border of 
the spatial area V.
The parameters a, P, p wholly define the 
parameters of the self-excitation and external 
influence, so analytical type to functions F k , I k , B k 
depends from physical essence of the process only.
Acceptance of initial (3) and border (4) of the 
conditions in nontraditional type is connected with 
that the parameters are measured and exist not 
directly; and inaccuracy of the indirect observation 
is one of the factor to uncertainties. So, in [3] is 
noted that places of FCM are fixed with such 
indirect way of the observations as: ultrasonic, heat 
exchange, radar and neutron flows, which are 
checked by systems “Tent” and “Finish”, 
displacement of responsible designs are measured 
with strain gauge, etc.
We take that parameters X k c t , f i ,p  have small
inaccuracy and in tasks (2) -  (4) they are averaged 
by some methods. Then on space-time of 
definitional domain dynamic variables u there exists 
“microinaccuracy” i.e. small detours 5k, 8a, 8p 
from averaged value. Hereupon decision of averaged 
tasks (2)-(4) u is deviate from real u, on 
value v = u r -  u . The question is correct delivered to 
a problem, in which decision continuously depends 
on conditions of the problem. So v is taken small; it 
is herewith noted that linear correlations for v are 
built for the reason of determinations of the trends 
on the behavior of v.
The problem consists of: presents of decision u 
of averaged problems (2)—(4) under investigation 
phenomena with acceptable accuracy, or
“microuncertaities”, for “leads away” of averaged 
problem from reality, but to reach the required small 
size to inaccuracy, it was necessary to fix the 
condition of the problem with unrealistic accuracy. 
The above problem -is an engineering analogue of 
the question about stability of the moving 
mechanical system and question of correctness of 
mathematical model.
Trend of the divergence of the decisions is 
defined by behavior of the outraged decision u+v, 
which satisfies to problems (2)-(4) with outraged 
parameters, Xk + 8%k , a  + 8 a , p + 8 p . The neces­
sary linearization is possible in view of a priori small 
size of the indignations problem:
dVi,
¥ v i + I / h v » + s ? t =-
m
v k ( 0 , x )  =  8v°k ( x ) , k - l , N  :
d t
(Ln)v + Kv = Svp + 8cp, x e d V ,  












Siy = ~ (L 8 n )u  ;
d g k =
D B  '
D u
d F ,





D p  







8p„ =  0 .
dum dpn
We solve the system (5)-(7) in the manner of 
decompositions on own functions:
v ( t ,  x )  =  v b (t , x )  +  W {k)e Mkt \ W ( k )  x
k =0 v
8v°(x)-v4(0,x)+Je [8g----
о V d t  )
’ ( 8)
where \ ik -  own importances linearize systems;
—(£)
W  -  an ortonormal to own functions; \ b{ t , x )  -  a 
decision of quasistationar problem:
+ =0> x e V ;  (9)
(Z«)v + K v  =  Sip + Sep, x e d V ,  (10)
which shows that trend of the development to 
inaccuracy v  at time is defined by signs of the real 
parts of Lyapunov’s values j dk , then gradients of the 
own forms define the trend of the influence of the 
border conditions and features of the ambience.
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Because of their numerical implementation, 
statistical and dynamical calculations for building 
structures (for dead weight, snow, earthquake, 
aircraft crash, etc. [4]) are carrying out for point (not 
continual) models, where dynamical variables, 
describing the status of system, have high number of 
dimension (up to several thousand points).
However, use of conservative assessments does 
not exclude essential errors in the analysis of real SO 
state. For example, it takes place during the 
assessment of long-term bearing capacity of SO 
building structures. Owing to climatic, radiation and 
other processes, these structures are -aging and are 
characterized by uncertainty in elastic characteristics 
and grip conditions, decreased rigidity propertied 
compared with the normative (reference) properties. 
The latter are accepted for dynamical calculations 
with the empirical weakening coefficients. Under 
these conditions it can be supposed that calculated 
stress and displacement fields would be the 
conservative estimate -  upper estimate. But more 
complicate cases also can occur. Because of many 
microcracks, the rigidity parameters can change 
macroscopically as a result of elastic wave passing. 
However, in materials, weakened with high 
concentration of micro cracks, the mechanism of 
accumulation of fatigue after wave passing seems 
more probable; in this case, the rigidity parameters 
become worse monotonically. As a second example, 
the bifurcation analysis for temperature fields can be 
given. Estimation of the temperature fields of 
residual heat in subcritical FCM is based on multiple 
assumptions, because there is no valid information 
on heat exchange, geometry and composition of 
FCM. The reason to exclude them from 
consideration during safety analysis is not only their 
non-determinacy, but also difficulty of constructive 
probabilistic assessment. In other words, at least for 
“soft” safety analysis [4], such effects are not taken 
into account. However, this fact can lead to great 
discrepancy in simulation and nature investigations. 
The general regularity is observed: the possibility of 
such discrepancy appears there, where in the model 
small non-linearity is neglected.
The Analysis to stability greatly nonlinear 
models have gained in recently multiple exhibits. In 
particular, to studies of the kinetics are broadly used 
methods of the nonlinear functional analysis and 
theory of bifurcation in dynamic systems. The Main 
theoretical positions in consequence of their 
generalities are carried as well as on dynamic of the 
processes in SO. For the numerical analysis it is 
effectively to use the variational wordings, on base 
on which are built variational-set (certainly-element) 
of the scheme. The Vector-function, and w(/,x),
describing physical process, which is possible to 
model by differential initial-marginal Problem with 
limited variation of coefficients, minimizes certain 
terminal-integral nonlinear and not square-law 
functional;
h
& (u ,  a) = J J\|/K (t , x, u, u ) d V  +
hlv
+ j\j/g(?,x,w,a) ] d t +  |Q F(q,t2,x,M,a) +
SV V
+ ^Q.g ( t l , t 2 , x , u , a ) d ( d V ) . (11)
dV
Here a  marks the collection of parameters, which 
defines the ambience, parameters of the self­
excitation and external influence; the underintegralto 
functions, as a rule, comprise itself of differential 
operators of 1-st or more high order. The Necessities 
condition of extremum 80(w; a) = 0 must be 
executed for all small variations of the decision §u, 
including that, which is caused by small variations 
of parameters 8 a
0ada + 0u6u = O. (12)
Variation 8 u  is hung. On the grounds of 
correlations (12) loss to stability to models is 
possible to interpreted with the general position as 
loss of insufficiency by operator d>a. The last is 
guaranteed, for instance, in problem of building 
mechanical engineering only for problems from 
class Sen-Venan; herewith in FCM current condition 
of many designs removes them from given class. 
Under limited operator <3>u and unlimited O a , 
vagary is guaranteed. The loss of stability in 
consequence of an excess by external influence of 
certain level and indignations of parameters of 
ambiences is entered here. There are known such 
quotient events, as loss forms of the balance by 
designs or origin of selfsupporting chain reaction.
So, it is seen that when potential accidental process 
with extreme parameters is calculated, any simplify- 
cation should be well substantiated, though such 
substantiation could be as complicate as calculation by 
“accurate” model. That is why the response in model 
problem is the numerical characteristic that describes in 
full extent the negative aspects of the process and that is 
not sensitive, at least, to the above-mentioned 
inaccuracies.
So, the model calculation [2] has shown that SO 
roof collapse, that is the main type of functional 
failure, will lead to the release of about 2 tons of 
radioactive dust with total activity of about 2600 Ci 
into the environment. Validity of the initial data, 
different scenarios and reasons of collapse, 
accompanying natural and man-caused events can 
increase or decrease this estimation.
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Assessment of influence of initial events on the 
stability of SO safety analysis has shown that there 
is great dispersion in the final estimates of risk 
functions. So, these estimates seem to be the expert 
estimates, though they are reflecting high level of 
hazard of this group of initial events. The first such 
event is SO failure, caused by degradation. It has the 
probability, which varies, by different estimates [4], 
from 0.08 to 0.1, and its risk function varies from 
200 to 260 Ci/a. The second event is fire inside SO. 
For this event, mechanism and quantity of released 
materials is not clarified completely, as well as its 
influence on probability of SO failure.
Countermeasures
Basing on brief risk analysis and possible 
scenarios for arising and progression of radiation 
accidents inside SO, three types of countermeasures 
could be formulated.
Tactical countermeasures: measures, performed 
at SO to prevent collapse, failure, criticality and 
radiological hazard. These measures, as a rule, are 
short-term. They require involving human and 
material resources during, in fact, undefined period 
of SO operation. At the same time, there is no 
absolute assurance that these tactical countermeasu­
res would prevent radiation accident at SO. 
Stabilization is a basic element of tactical 
countermeasures. Along with strengthening of 
building structures, it is necessary also to stabilize 
current conditions of FCM accumulations, elements 
of the reactor system and hydrogeological situation 
at the industrial site.
Passive countermeasures: measures, performed at 
SO to decrease consequences of radiation accidents 
at SO by timely creation of accident localization 
systems. These countermeasures are long-term 
measures. They require involving significant human 
and material resources in short period of time 
(construction phase) and constant operation during, 
in fact, undefined period of time. Creation of SO-2, 
either as containment (heavy Sheter-2) or as 
confinement (light SO-2) is the key element of 
passive countermeasures. To prevent release of 
radionuclides outside the industrial site, as a passive 
countermeasure, hydro geological protection, 
localizing FCM and other RW outside SO, should be 
created.
Active countermeasures: measures, performed at 
SO to exclude radiation hazard, if an accident 
occurs. These are the measures eliminating the 
causes of radiation accidents, i.e. excluding the 
accidents at all. Active countermeasures require 
involving significant human and material resources 
during limited period of time (active phase),
transform SO and the industrial site into radiation 
safe object after completion of the active phase. The 
problem of SO dismantling and conversion of SO 
industrial site into “green lawn” can be postponed by 
uncertain term and performed, if necessary, 
according to the rules of ordinary civil engineering. 
FCM and other FCM retrieval from SO solves all 
questions necessaiy for significant decrease of 
radiation risk from SO existence and for 
decommissioning of destroyed ChNPP Unit 4.
Characteristic peculiarities of a procedure applied 
during safety analysis (risk assessment) of the SO 
encasement are discussed, as well as those of the 
encasement itself which take effect on developing 
such procedure. Indicators (functions) of risk to be 
used are formulated; the efficiency of their choice is 
discussed. A mathematical aspect of considering the 
parameters uncertainty within the SO when modeling 
accident processes is characterized, as well as this 
uncertainty's influence upon values of risk functions. 
Some quantitative estimation of risk indicators is 
presented along with conclusions about their quality.
Results of numerical analysis of stress-deformed 
State of supporting constructions of the beams Bl, 
B2 of the SO encasement roof are presented, the 
beams being located on the axes 50 intersection. The 
structural scheme of the encasement with
consideration of present destructions has been 
restored based upon data of archival research and 
visual inspection of available constructions. It is 
shown that the structural scheme must include not 
only direct supporting of the beams Bl and B2 but 
also a pile of fallen constructions and friable 
materials, steam separators, walls and bars of the 
block B lying lower. A finite element model of the 
beams support junction is implemented with 
consideration of the structural scheme.
Computations are performed for various principal 
and peculiar combinations of loads. Basing on 
consideration of results obtained, most dangerous 
loads and influences combinations are discovered as 
well as structure's zones loaded most strongly.
The mathematical model of formation and 
movement of dust cloud in the SO encasement when 
its roof falls has been developed. The proposed 
method and computer program allow to research 
process of formation of cloud at different scenarios 
of the SO destruction. The numeral research results 
can be used for developing of dust suppression 
system and other measures for elimination of 
consequences of Chernobyl accident.
A complex operative model of PS numerical 
prognosis on the speed fields of wind, temperature, 
pressure, nebulosity, precipitation and on the 
formation and transfer of the pollution fields from
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instantaneous and permanent sources of admixture 
ejections into the atmosphere under real weather 
conditions in the region of arbitrary linear 
dimensions. The model allows solving the problem 
of atmospheric status prognosis due to a technogenic 
impact of industrial enterprise work in regular or 
accident regimes. The problem solution will find its 
application in transborder transfers prognoses of 
pollutions in the atmosphere.
There is evaluated effectiveness of one 
alternative emergency fight-dust system of object 
“SO”. Investigation of interaction between particles 
of dust and drops of fight-dust fluid is based on 
probability methods. Movement of air and particles 
of dust ad drops or liquid is investigated by 
numerical finite-difference method, w'hich is based 
on method Mc'Cormac. The results of calculations 
of effectiveness fight-dust system are presented for 
two values of speed of air -  5 and 35 m/s.
It deals with purposes and features of an 
application program package developed for 
researching thermal and mechanical phenomena 
within SO encasement, Chernobyl 1986 accident and 
potentially possible ones modeling, reliability and 
safety analysis of the encasement. The structure and 
purpose of databases for keeping and classifying 
information related to the “SO” encasement are 
described. Perspectives of the package and the 
databases control systems development are 
reviewed.
The elaboration of automatic control systems, 
based on radar technology for interest safety SO 
encasement and Chernobyl zone are described in this 
article. Three systems are described. First, this is 
automatic radio geodesy system for measuring of 
shift of roof beams of SO encasement. Second, this 
is radio technical system for distance discovery of 
fires in Chernobyl zone, based on principle of 
multichannel heat direction finder. Third, this is 
combine system of distance sounding of
underground environment for discovery of
radioactive materials.
The general procedure for the determination of 
topography of the reactor active core wreckage 
ejected by explosion as a result of the Chernobyl 
NPP accident has been developed. The regions of 
the failure and the reactor active core ejection have 
been constructed by the numerical experiment series. 
The active core wreckage motion in the field of 
gravity has been explored. The ejected fragments 
topography for the case of the active core explosion 
in the standard position and over the reactor section 
plating has been constructed.
A structural scheme of operational state of the 
CNPP 4 block is built with usage of archival 
documents. Various versions of spatial finite
element models are developed; they allow the 
realization of the 4 block structural scheme with 
various extents of detailing, using application 
software packages COSMOS, SCAD and ROBOT.
Analyses of peculiar stress-deformed states of the 
4 block under various combinations of loads and 
influences are performed in order to estimate 
efficiency of the FEM models versions developed. 
Based on the result consideration a computational 
model of the 4 block is chosen for further numerical 
analysis of its constructions' mechanical behavior, 
including that in the course of the core accident and 
in the course of localization and mitigation of the 
accident consequences.
Analysis of methods of the safety assessment of 
the “Ukritiye” encasement demonstrates that the 
existing standard codes and technical support are 
insufficient to obtain true quantitative characteristics 
of the encasement for the case of initial event's 
causation. Mistaken assumptions have resulted in 
decreasing the level of risk assessment conservatism 
adopted in official requirements. It is proposed that 
system analysis approach be used to research and 
assess negative consequences of the “Ukritiye” 
protection barriers' destruction. A solution is 
obtained from synthesis of probabilistic and 
deterministic methods as well as from usage of tool 
inspections and expert estimates to verify source 
data and results. The direction being proposed is 
implemented for all phases of risk assessment.
Characteristic examples are presented for the 
analysis of consequences of the initial events of an 
aircraft falling upon the “Ukritiye” and external 
explosions.
Characteristic peculiarities of a procedure applied 
during safety analysis (risk assessment) of the 
“Ukrytiye” encasement are discussed, as well as 
those of the encasement itself which take effect on 
developing such procedure. Indicators (functions) of 
risk to be used are formulated; the efficiency of their 
choice is discussed. A mathematical aspect of 
considering the parameters' uncertainty within the 
“Shelter” when modeling accident processes is 
characterized, as well as this uncertainty's influence 
upon values of risk functions. Some quantitative 
estimation of risk indicators is presented along with 
conclusions about their quality.
Conclusions
As a result of investigation of SO, as the most 
characteristic representative of EO class, it was 
determined that the problem of theoretical safety 
analysis includes the questions o: modification of 
normative methods for NPP aimed at working out 
SO risk assessment method. For this purpose, object
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evolution models are used. These models are based on 
applied aspects of the theory of random processes. 
Uncertainty of parameters, characteristic for SO, makes 
analysis of qualitative behavior of mathematical models 
of physical processes and actual part of calculations. In 
this connection, rational choice of risk functions is based 
both on considerations of completeness of description of 
consequences of hypothetical accidents and on 
considerations of possibility for constructive assessment 
of values of these functions. The latter is done to ensure 
that use of these functions during making design 
decisions will be really productive and will demonstrate 
the efficiency of performed theoretical analysis.
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Ю.В. Верюжський
Імовірність та детерміністична оцінка ризиків екстремальних об’єктів і екологічно загрозливих систем
Наведено основні результати робіт Науково-дослідного інституту механіки швидкоплинних 
процесів, спрямованих на створення методології оцінки ризиків і керування ризиками екологічно 
загрозливих систем, що складаються з різноманітних технологічних об’єктів і елементи яких можуть 
характеризуватися високим рівнем радіаційної, токсичної, експлуатаційної, пожежної та іншими 
загрозами. Описано ймовірнісну і детерміністичну частини оцінки ризиків, які базуються на 
математичних методах системного аналізу, нелінійної динаміки та комп’ютерного моделювання. 
Ураховано множину розгалужень загальної задачі, різні фактори та критерії, що впливають на стан 
системи і вибір стратегії керування ризиками. Розглянуто ризики як на суб’єктивній, так і на 
об’єктивній підставі з урахуванням людського фактора. Показано, що основним елементом 
досліджень, домінуючим у визначенні безпеки системи, є аналіз конструктивної частини об’єкта. 
Запропоновано методологію оцінки ризиків використовувати для аналізу безпеки об’єкта “Укриття” 
Чорнобильської АЕС та інших промислових об’єктів.
Ю.В. Верюжский
Вероятностная и детерминистическая оценка рисков экстремальных объектов и экологически 
опасных систем
Приведены основные результаты работ Научно-исследовательского института механики 
быстротечных процессов, направленных на создание методологии оценки рисков и управление 
рисками экологически опасных систем, которые состоят из разнообразных технологических объектов 
и элементы которых могут характеризоваться высоким уровнем радиационной, токсичной, 
эксплуатационной и пожарной опасности. Описаны вероятность и детерминистические части оценки 
рисков, которые базируются на математических методах системного анализа, нелинейной динамики 
и компьютерного моделирования. Учтено множество разветвлений общей задачи, разные факторы и 
критерии, влияющие на состояние системы и выбор стратегии управления рисками. Рассмотрены 
риски как на субъективной, так и на объективной основе с учетом человеческого фактора. Показано, 
что главным элементом исследований, доминирующим в определении безопасности системы, 
является анализ конструктивной части объекта. Предложено методологию оценки рисков 
использовать для анализа безопасности объекта «Укрытие» Чернобыльской АЭС и других 
промышленных объектов.
